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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the effect which varied levels 
of risk, achieved through results of advertising expenditures, have 
on subjects in an oligopoly game situation. The primary objective 
is to determine statistically the differences in response to the 
game of subjects with different attitudes toward risk under the 
varied levels of risk. 
The author wishes to express her appreciation to her major adviser 
Dr. Joseph Jadlow, for his guidance and assistance throughout this 
study. Appreciation is also expressed to the other committee members, 
Dr. Gerald Lage, Dr. Robert Sandmeyer, and Dr. Elliot Weiner, for 
their invaluable assistance in the preparation of the final manuscript. 
A note of thanks is given to Mr. James Edwards, Division of 
Business, Northeast Missouri State University, for help in recruiting 
subjects. Thanks are also extended to Dr. Joe Flowers, Dr. John 
Beuckman, and Mr. Duane Norman for help in preparing computer programs. 
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Motivation for the Study 
Do subjects with different attitules toward risk choose 
different strategies in an oligopoly business game? How do subjects 
with different attitudes toward risk react under varied levels of 
risk? These are the questions to whi.ch this study is addressed. 
Sherman (26) states that: 
Most oligopoly theories can be separated into 
two parts, one involving a choice structure which 
specifies payoffs for alternative actions, and another 
dealing with the behavior of those who face that choice 
and payoff structure (p. 91). 
Each of the two questions posed above relates to a part of this 
definition of oligopoly theory. An examination of choices by 
subjects with different risk attitudes is concerned with the behavior 
of subjects, while varied levels of risk within a game is realted 
to the choice structure of the situation. 
Sherman (26) goes on to say that" ••. it is easy to see that 
behavior cannot be predicted in a deterministic way; social psychology 
and experimental economics have a useful role to play" (p. 4). 
Differences in levels of risk is only .one of a wide range of 
market aspects which could be investigated. Risk is an important 
variable on two levels. First, economists seem to agree that the 
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level of risk faced by firms in different market structures varies. 
Scherer (23) quotes J.R. Hicks as having said, "The best of monopoly 
profits is a quiet life" (p. 32). 
Secondly, when dealing with oligopolistic mark~t structures, 
risk attitudes of individuals ma.y be important in determining 
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market behavior. However, this is true only if individuals with 
different risk attitudes react differently in a market situation. 
Experimental economics provides a method of investigating this matter. 
Also, empirical tests of levels of risk faced by firms are difficult 
to conduct. 
Varied returns to advertising expenditures was chosen as the 
vehicle to achieve different levels of risk within the game for 
two reasons. First, expenditures on advertising are an important 
component in the U.S. economy. Scherer (23, p. 329) states that 
$17 billion, 2 percent of GNP, were spent on advertising in the 
U.S. in 1968. The second reason concerns problems encountered in 
treating advertising in price theory. Price theory allows for 
determination of optimal advertising expenditures, at least in a 
partial equilibrium sense (22, pp. 64-66). However, some economists 
feel that advertising decisions are not adequately dealt with in 
such analysis (16). Therefore, it seems that consideration of adver-
tising expenditures from a variety of viewpoints is useful. 
Experimental Economics 
Experimental economics differs from most economic analysis in 
that in an economic experiment an attempt is made to set up a 
controlled situation within which subjects are asked to participate 
by making the remainder constant. Behavior of the subjects with 
respect to the simulated situation can be observed ~s some elements 
are changed. 
A defense of experimental economics appears in James Friedman's 
"Individual Behavior in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental 
Study" which was published in 1963 (8). Experiments may be parti-
cularly helpful, he. says, in examining those economic theories 
concerning simplified situations. The experimenter can set up a 
similar situation, and test the behavior of subjects against the 
theory under consideration. Other advantages of the experimental 
method listed by Friedman are the difficulty of getting empirical 
data from industries, the fact that such data is not always in the 
form needed by the economist, and the ability of the experimenter 
to design a situation containing only those elements in which he is 
interested. 
Experiments in economics also entail some disadvantages. 
Questions concerning motivation of subjects and their time horizon 
compared with that of businessmen can be 'raised. Other differences 




Sherman (26) feels that the main advantage of experimental 
economics is that" ••• their results can be accumulated ••• so with 
time, elaborations of oligopoly behavior which are closer approxima-
tions of the real world may also be exposed to experimental investiga-
tions, part by part" (p. 5). He also states that experimental 
economics is the only method available to examine psychological 
influences on oligopolistic behavior (26, p. 11). 
The Experiment 
The Game 
An experiment and its results are reported here. Using the 
. * Kogan-Wallach Social Risk Preference test (19) risk attitudes of 
subjects are determined. Then subjects are asked to participate 
in a business game ~ith price and ~dvertising budget as decision 
variables. 
Two versions of the same game are played. In the first, subjects 
are faced with a given profit table. In the second version, amount 
of profits received by the subject varies at times, in part according 
to level of advertising and in part at random. Thus, in the second 
version, the level of risk faced by the subject is increased through 
a varied payoff structure. A measure of cooperativeness, S, will be 
computed from data for each subject in each round of play. 
The data obtained will allow differences between S values, 
advertising budgets, prices, and profits to be examined under four 
* This test is described at length below, and is reproduced in 
Appendix A. 
situations: between high and low risk game for risk lovers; between 
high and low risk game for risk averters; between risk lovers and 
risk averters in the high risk game; and between risk lovers and 
risk averters in the low risk game.·.· 
The Hypotheses 
Three hypotheses will be considered. In general terms, the 
first hypothesis states that subjects will be able to make some 
sense out of the game. The second hypothesis is that risk averters 
will play more cooperatively and will choose higher advertising 
budgets than will risk lovers. The final hypothesis is·that both 
risk averters and risk lovers playing in the high risk game will have 
significantly different advertising budgets and S values than those 
of subjects playing in the low risk game. 
Findings 
The statistical results of the study indicate that subjects 
were able to handle the relatively complicated game. The Social Risk 
Preference test was successful in discriminating between subjects 
who behaved differently as far as prices, advertising choices, and 
profits were concerned in the.low risk game, but· only in the case of 
prices in the high risk game. Social Risk Preference test scores 
did not discriminate between different S values for either the high 
or low risk game. 
5 
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Outline of Study 
Chapter II presents a survey of the literature dealing with 
experimental oligopoly research. Chapter III .discusses the framework 
I 
of oligopoly, risk, and advertising within which the experiment is 
designed. The experiment, the model from which it is drawn, and 
the hypotheses which the experiment is to test are described in 
Chapter IV. Chapter V explains the procedures for the experiment, 
while Chapter VI reports the statistical results of the experiment 
and their application to the hypotheses. Chapter VII sunnnarizes 
the study and contains conclusions, suggestions for further work, and 






Experimental games have been used in economics, as well as in 
other social sciences, increasingly in the past twenty-five years. 
In 1948, Chamberlin (3) reported the results of an experiment he had 
run in the classroom. This article is considered to be the first 
published report of an economic experiment (8). He noted that the 
social scientist who would like to study the eff~cts of certain 
forces felt obliged to experiment through general reasoning applied 
to abstract models. The purpose of his article, he said, was to 
make "a very tiny breach in this position" (3, p. 95). His experi-
ment dealt with bargaining in buying and selling on an imperfect market. 
For several years, experimental economics dealt with utility 
problems. Because this study is concerned with experimental oligopoly, 
work in other areas of experimental economics will not be reported 
here. In the late 1950's work directly concerned with oligopoly 
market situations began to be reported. 
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Hoggatt 
Hoggatt (13) in 1959 reported on an experimental business game 
designed to test the predictive ability of the Cournot model in a 
simulated economic situation. He used faculty members of the School 
of Business Administration, University of California, as subjects 
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in a quantity choice experiment. Subjects were not rewarded for their 
performance, and no control over counnunication between subjects was 
exercised. 
The Cournot model refers to a market containing two or more firms. 
Under Cournot's assumption that each firm expects others to produce 
the same amount in each period as in the last period, individual 
firm profit maximization results. Hoggatt hypothesized that short 
run Cournot-type behavior would result from his experiment, rather than 
either Cournot behavior with a longer time horizon or joint profit 
maximization. In9ustry outputs close to damped, irregular oscil-
lations around the short run Cournot quantity levels were found. 
Fouraker and Siegel 
Fouraker and Siegel (6) did much of the early work in the area 
of experimental economics. Their first book on the subject, published 
in 1960, refined the experimental,techniques of predecessors. Subjects 
were paid their profits, and communication between subjects was 
controlled. This book dealt with bilateral monopoly. The principal 
hypotheses tested were: that the subjects would be more apt to 
choose the Cournot solution under imperfect information than under 
perfect information, and that variability of decisions of subjects 
would be greater under complete information. than under incomplete 
* information situations. 
James Friedman 
James Friedman (8) reported the results of some experiments in 
oligopolistic markets in 1963. His work merits more discussion here 
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than others sin.ce his method is somewhat similar to that used in this 
study. Also his procedures are representative of many of the studies 
for which results are reported here. 
Friedman set up a carefully controlled situation. Subjects were 
undergraduates recruited through the financial aids office. The 
games were held in a room arranged so that communication between 
subjects was impossible. Games varied in length from 22 to 26 
,:\. 
periods and subjects were paid the profit they ea1"ned on each period. 
Each subject was given a set of instructions, a set of small sheets 
used to record their price decisions and identifying numbers, and 
payoff matrices which recorded both the subject's profits and the 
average of his opponents' profits for each possible combination 
of price decision of the subject and average price decision of his 
opponents. 
Variables with which Friedman's hypotheses were concerned 
included amount of information given the subjects, number of players 
* Incomplete information refers to the situation where the 
subject does not know what sort of profit function his opponent faces. 
Under complete information, the subject is given the profit data 
which his opponent or opponents face. 
in each market, and differences in structure of games. He also 
* compared competitiveness of behavior of subjects with that of their 
opponents. Many of his results agreed with those of Fouraker and 
Siegel's 1960 book (28). In a later article (9) he criticized his 
own work by noting that he had tried to allow as much as possible 
to vary, and therefore got few c·lear cut results for any of his 
variables. 
Fouraker and Siegel 
Fouraker and Siegel's (6) second book, Bargaining Behavior, 
appeared in 1963. This work reported results of experiments in 
oligopoly markets of various sizes, using experimental techniques 
similar to those used in their earlier work. They varied the number 
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of subjects, the number of transactions, and the level of payoff. In 
some games, price was the decision variable, while in others quantity 
was the choice variable. 
Fouraker and Siegel categorized behavior of subjects as 
maximizing individual profits or as joint profit maximization, using 
classical oligopoly models as comparison. Under conditions -of 
incomplete information they found the individual profit maximization 
solution prevailed, while under complete information conditions, 
a variety of results was obtained. 
* Cooperative behavior refers to a subject's decisions which 
result in profits in that industry which are near the joint profit 
maximization. Competitive behavior is characterized by a subject's 
decisions resulting in individual profit maximization instead of joint 
maximization of profits. 
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Murphy 
In 1966 Murphy (21) published the results of a replication of 
Fouraker and Siegel's Bargaining Behavior work. The main difference 
between Murphy's work and that of Fouraker and Siegel was that Murphy 
included the possibility of losses in the profit tables given to 
subjects. Murphy found more cooperative behavior as a result of 
including possible losses. 
Summary 
The work discussed thus far is representative of one type of 
experimental oligopoly game. Interest is centered on allowing 
variation in a few aspects of the game, primarily the number of 
subjects in a market and the level of information. Two points emerge 
from this work. First, subjects' behavior is more cooperative 
under complete information than under incomplete. Second, as the 
number of subjects in a game increases, behavior becomes more 
competitive. 
Later Development 
Work done after that reported above tended to accept the results 
of these earlier experiments, and to move toward considering more 
complex variables, particularly those of a psychological.nature. 
Friedman had looked at the responses of subjects in terms of the 
type of behavior exhibited by opponents in previous rounds. More 
of this type of research followed. 
Also of interest was a movement away from characterizing 
behavior of subjects according to classical oligopoly models, such 
as those of Pareto, Bowley, or Cournot. Instead behavior came to 
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be most often classified as cooperative or competitive, and sometimes 
as rivalistic. In some studies a numerical index of competitiveness 
of behavior was developed (7 and 14). 
Johnson and Cohen 
A few examples of this more complicated work will illustrate 
the variables to which interest was turned. Johnson and Cohen (15) 
reworked Fouraker and Siegel's Bargaining Behavior experiments, using 
business, law, and theology students as subjects. A study of values 
test, measuring the relative strength of six motives or value 
outlooks in personality, was administered to all subjects. Results 
pointed to a difference in behavior which was partly related to 
chosen career. Business students were more cooperative than were 
law and theology students. The results from the value preference 
test were somewhat inconclusive, although usually differences were 
in the expected direction. 
Harnett, Cununings, and Hughes 
Harnett, Cununings, and Hughes (11) used the Kogan Wallach 
Social Risk Preference test to try to explain variation in profit 
levels and willingness to yield from an initial position in a bar-
gaining situation. Their results showed that profits were not related 
to Social Risk Preference test scores, but some negative relation 
did exist between risk-taking propensity and coop~rative behavior. 
Carlson and O'Keefe 
Two empirical articles appeared in the October, 1969, Review of 
Economic Studies, along with a review article by Friedman (9) of 
earlier experimental oligopoly games. Carlson and b'Keefe (2) 
designed an experiment in which subjects were given a set selling 
price for their product along with varying costs of units of goods 
produced and of goods held in inventory. Subjects were business 
majors, but had had no formal training in inventory theory. Results 
showed that subjects were able to do fairly well with the problem, 
but that movement toward any optimal rule of inventory size was slow 
and sometimes nonexistant. 
Sherman 
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Sherman's (27) "Risk Attitude and Cost Variability in a Capacity 
Choice Experiment" is representative of several of his experiments 
reported in Oligopoly (26). Subjects chose a long-run capacity size, 
represented by choice of a particular prisoner's dilennna matrix 
from several, and then chose courses of action within that game 
matrix. These choices, within the matrix, represented short-run 
decisions. Subjects were given the Kogan Wallach Social Risk Pre-
ference test. Sherman found a tendency for subjects tolerant of 
risk to compete mo~e than those subjects who were more risk averse. 
Results from this experiment have been published in The Journal of 
Psychology as well (25). 
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Summary 
This outline of previous work in experimental oligopoly games, 
while not exhaustive, gives the reader an idea of the direction 
of development. Design of experiments has been growing in complexity 
as well as becoming more refined. A wider range of variables within 
the framework of the experiment has been considered. 
This Study Compared to Earlier Studies 
This study deals with an oligopoly experiment in terms of price 
and advertising budget decisions under different levels of ·risk. 
Price as a decision variable has been connnon, while advertising budget 
has not been used. 
Attempts have been made to find relationships between risk 
attitudes and decision variables. Other studies have also attempted 
to find a relationship. However, no experiments have been reported 
in which subjects have faced varied levels of risk. 
A direct relationship can be traced from James Friedman's 
"An Experimental Study of Cooperative Duopoly" (8) and Roger Sherman's 
work with risk attitudes and capacity choice (25 and 26) to the pre-
sent study. For instance, the mathematical model used in this paper 
is an expanded version of the model used by Friedman. Also, the 
manner in which the Social Risk Preference test is used is similar 
to Sherman's method. 
CHAPTER III 
FRAMEWORK OF THE EXPERIMENT 
This chapter is a discussion of three importaht economic 
constructs. Oligopoly, risk, and advertising make up the framework 
in which the experiment reported here takes place. 
Oligopoly 
Importance of Reactions in Oligopoly 
" 
Needham (22) defines oligopoly as a market situation in which 
the demand conditions confronting the individual firm depend 
upon the firm's assumptions regarding the way in which other firms 
will react to its own policies ••• " (p. 51). He makes the point that 
the number of firms is unimportant, by itself, in determining whether 
or not a market situation is oligopolistic. Rather, the important 
determinant is the firms' assumptions about rivals' reactions. 
"Therefore, whether numbers influence behavior depends on whether 
numbers themselves influence each firm's expectations regarding the 
behavior Ei_ its rivals" (Emphasis is Needham's) (22, p. 83). 
Scherer (23) expands on the importance of assumed reactions of 
rival firms. He states that the uncertainties which make demand 
curve estimation difficult interact with" the problems of 
predicting oligopolistic rival reactions in a manner which undermines 
15 
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the operational utility of the orthodox profit maximization calculus" 
(23, p. 149). The effect of actions and reactions of rivals on an 
oligopolistic firm's demand curve and the constant motion of the 
firm's environment work together to cause problems with economic 
theory. 
Variables in Oligopoly 
Regarding the theory of oligopoly pricing, Scherer (23) con-
cludes that in order to make workable predictions, a much richer 
theory is needed in the study of oligopoly thari for pure monopoly 
or pure competition. Variables which are irrelevant in the cases of 
pure monopoly and pure competition must be included. 
Market Situation in this Study 
The market situation used in this study is that of duopoly, 
a subset of oligopoly. All markets in which subjects participate 
are made up of only two firms. The feature of the experiment which 
makes the market situation one of oligopoly is the interdependence 
of a firm's decisions with that of its rival. 
Risk 
Risk in Early Economics 
The second important element in the experimental framework 
presented here is the construct of risk. Discussions of the effect 
of risk in economics were easy to find earlier in this century. In 
particular, Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (18), first 
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published in 1921, is well known. Economists are familiar with the 
distinction he made between uncertainty and risk. However, according 
to Stigler (18), in the introduction to the latest edition of 
Knight's book, "Modern analysis no longer views the two classes as 
different in kind" (p. xiv). 
Definition of Risk 
An elementary level text in insurance, Greene's Risk and 
Insurance (lQ), defines risk as "the uncertainty as to the occurrence 
of an economic loss" (p. 2). According to this definition, risk is 
measured in terms of the degree of variation that actual events 
bear to probable events. The extent of risk is determined by the 
amount of possible variability of the event under consideration. 
Thus, an event with widely variable possible outcomes is considered 
to be more risky than one with less variable probable outcomes. This 
definition is the working definition of risk used in this study. The 
terms risk and uncertainty are used interchangeably. 
Within price theory, economists have done little empirical 
work on different levels of risk which can be faced by firms under 
different conditions. However, within the realm of monetary economics, 
differentiation has been made between risk averters (those who tend 
to overvalue uncertain losses and to undervalue uncertain gains) 
and risk lovers (those who tend to overvalue uncertain gains and to 
undervalue uncertain losses), particularly in portfolio adjustment 
theories (1, p. 50). 
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Risk in Psychology 
Psychologists have done some work in the area of determining 
which people are risk averters and which are risk lovers. However, 
much of their work is somewhat inapplicable to economics, as it 
deals with si-tuations in which subjects are asked to take risks on 
the performance of physical acts in experiments where no reward is 
given. 
Kogan and Wallach (19) have developed a psychological test, the 
Social Risk Preference Test (SRP test), which determines which sub-
jects are risk averters and which are risk lovers. This test was 
used in the experiment reported here and is discussed in detail in 
Chapter V. 
Psychology and Economics 
The area of risk is one in which economists and psychologists 
could profitably cooperate. During the second decade of this century, 
there were indications that psychologists and economists would be 
working together on a variety of subjects. J.M. Clark (4) and 
Wesley C. Mitchell (20) both published articles in major economic 
journals urging such cooperation. Clark (4) wrote: 
The economist may attempt to ignore psychology, 
but it is a sheer impossibility for him to ignore 
human nature, for his science is a science of human 
behavior. Any conception of human nature that he may 
adopt is a matter of psychology, and any conception 
of human behavior that he may adopt involves psychological 
assumptions, whether these be explicit or no, If the 
economist borrows his conception of man from the 
psychologist, his constructive work may have some 
chance of remaining purely economic in character. 
But if he does not he will not thereby avoid psy-
chology. Rather he will force himself to make his 
own, and it will be bad psychology (p. 4). 
Little in the way of cooperation between economists and psychologists 
resulted. 
George Katona (17) took up the idea later in the century. 
However, his work has centered primarjly on macroeconomics, with 
specific emphasis on consumer behavior in the macro sense. 
As far as price theory is concerned, experimental economics 
seems to have restored the thread of cooperation between psychologists 
and economists. Under experimental conditions, the effects, for 
example, of varied levels of risk on the behavior of risk lovers 
and risk averters can be studied. 
Advertising 
Advertising is the third construct which makes up the frame-
work for this experiment. According to Needham (22), advertising 
is one of a variety of ways in which a firm can achieve product 
differentiation. Advertising, however, differs from style changes 
and research and development activities in that "Advertising is 
a strategy for influencing the shape or the position of the demand 
curve for a firm's product without changing the physical character-
istics of the product" (22, p. 63). 
Advertising and Oligopoly 
Scherer (23) states that, on!!:_ priori grounds, one can expect 
to find higher levels of advertising under oligopoly than under 
other market situations. However, he says, mutual interdependence 
of oligopolistic Hrms might appear to keep advertising expenditures 
down, as any gain from a firm's advertising expenditures might be 
wiped out by matching expenditures from other firms in the market. 
But, empirical evidence suggests that this aspect of oligopoly 
does not seem to hold down advertising expenditures in oligopoly. 
Scherer points to the difference between price and advertising 
strategies as a possible reason. First, it takes weeks or months 
to instigate a new advertising strategy, but price changes can be 
matched almost at once. Also, the outcome of a change in an adver-
tising strategy is more unsure than that from a change in pricing 
strategy. Finally, formulating a successful advertising strategy 
may be more difficult than formulating price strategy. 
Advertising and Risk 
Not only are oligopoly and advertising closely related, but 
risk and advertising are also complementary ideas. Jones-Lee and 
Davenport (16) have published a theoretical model of advertising 
decision making under uncertainty. The impetus for their paper 
came from discussions with advertising executives in the confec-
tionary industry. They noted that in their discussions it became 
clear to them that 
••. the existing body of theory concerning the 
promotional expenditure decision is almost completely 
incapable of acconnnodating the extensive uncertainty 
which is an integral part of the promotional decision 
in a market such as that under consideration (16, p. 261). 
20 
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In Chapter IV of this study an economic experiment is described 
which investigates responses to varying levels of risk, attained 
through varying advertising results, in an oligopoly market situation. 
The three concepts discussed in this chapter underlie the simulated 
business situation in which the experiment takes place. 
CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Social Risk Preference Test 
* Recruited subjects will be given the Kogan Wallach Social Risk 
** Preference test which is reproduced in Appendix A. This is a test 
designed to measure tolerance for risky situations on the part of 
subjects. The test is made up of twelve situations, each presenting 
a risky and a safe alternative course of action. The same alternative 
results in a smaller reward than does .the risky alternative. The 
subjects are asked to state what level of probability of success they 
would have to be sure of in order to recommend the risky course of 
action. Scoring is done by averaging the probabilities of success 
required to accept the risky alternative from all twelve situations. 
Low scores indicate an acceptance of risk, while high scores indicate 
risk aversion. 
* The future tense is used in discussing the experiment in this 
chapter while in Chapter V the past tense is used. This practice 
is followed to indicate that those items discussed in this chapter 
were procedures decided upon before any part of the experiment was 
undertaken. Chapter V describes how the experiment actually was 
administered. 
** Permission to use the Social Risk Preference Test was granted 




Information given subjects, as well as a measure of cooperation, 
are derived from the following duopoly model: 
xl = a P1 + b P2 + d A1 + e A2 + f (1) 
cl = g Xl + Al (2) 
Rl = Pl xl - cl (3) 
X2 = a P 2 + b P 1 + d A2 + e ~ + f (4) 
c2 = g x2 + A2 (5) 
R2 = P2 x2 - c2 (6) 
xl and x2 are the quantities of X produced by firms 1 and 2 
respectively. c1 and c2 are costs of firms 1 and 2. R1 and R2 are 
profits of firms 1 and 2. P1 and P2 are prices charged by firms 1 
and 2. A1 and A2 are advertising expenditures of firms 1 and 2. 
Constants are represented by a, b, d, e, f ,. and g with a and e 'less 
than O, and b, d, g, and f greater than 0. 
A measure of cooperation Sis derived from the first order 
conditions for maximization of industry profits, maximization of 
individual firm profits, and maximization of the difference between 
the profits of the two firms. Consider: 
a (R1 + S R2) 
0 = (7) 
a P1 
a (R1 + S R2) 
0 = (8) 
a A1 
= 0 (9) 
= 0 (10) 
Equations (7) through (10) result in the following four equations: 
2 d(aP1 + bP1P2 + dP1A1 + eP1A2 + fpl - gaP1 
- gbP2 - gd~ - geA2 - gf - A1 + S(aP2 + bP1P2 
+ dA2P2 + eA1P2 + fP2 - gaP2 - gbP1 - ge~ -
gf - A2)) I P1 = O 
2 3(aP1 + bP1P2 + dP1A1 + eP1A2 + fP1 - gaP1 
- gbP2 - gdAl - geA2 - gf - Al+ s(aP2 + bP1P2 
+ dA2P2 + e~P2 + fP 2 - gaP2 - gbPl - geA1 -
gf - A2)) I A1 = 0 
. 2 . 
3(aP2 + bPl2 + dP2A2 + eP2A1 + fP 2 - gaP2 
- bgP2 - gdA2 - geA1 -·gf - A1 + S(aP1 + bP2P1 
+ dA1P1 + eA2P1 + fP1 - gaP1 - gbP 2 - geA2 -
gf - Ai)) I P 2 = o 
3(aP2 + bP1P2 + dP2A2 + eP2A1 + fP 2 - gaP2 
- bgP2 - gdA2 - gdA1 - gf - Al+ S(aP1 + bP2P1 
+ dA1P1 + eA2P1 + fP1 - gaP1 ~ gbP2 - geA2 -






Equations (11) through (14), when the partials are taken, result 
in the following four equations: 
2aP1 + bP2 + dAi + eA2 + f - ag + S(bP2 -' bg) = 0 (15) 
dP1 - gd - 1 + S(eP2 - ge) = 0 
2aP2 + bP1 + dA2 + eA1 = f - ag + S(bP1 - bg) = 0 
dP - gd - 1 + S(eP - ge) = 0 2 1 . 




industry profit maximization. This situation will be referred to as 
the cooperative solution. Where S = O, the first order conditions 
for individual firm profit maximization are obtained. This is the 
competitive solution. Letting S = -1 results in first order condi-
tions for maximizing the difference between profits of the two firms 
or the rivalistic solution. Thus, S becomes an index of cooperative 
* or competitive behavior (8). 
As mentioned in Chapter II, joint profit maximization for the 
industry, where S = 1, corresponds with the Pareto oligopoly model. 
The individual firm profit maximization solution, where S = O, is 
equivalent to the Cournot model (12, p. 228). The use of Sas an 
index of behavior allows classification of behavior on a continuum 
instead of restricting classification to polar cases. 
* A similar index of behavior was used by Hoggatt (12) in 
an experiment in which subjects played against computers. The 
computer was set to play a given level of behavior, a given level 




Subjects for the experiment will be recruited from junior and 
senior level business courses. After SRP test scores are computed 
pairings will be made with high; medium and low scorers playing 
against subjects from each .of the classes so tests of the behavior 
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of one risk class will include play against partners of all risk 
classes. Subjects will be divided into 2/5 high scorers, 2/5 low 
scorers, and 1/5 medium scorers. An equal number of the following 
games will be played: high scorer with high scorer, high scorer with 
medium scorer, high scorer with low scorer, low scorer with medium 
scorer, and low scorer with low scorer. 
Administration of the Game 
At the time of the experiments, subjects will be given a profit 
matrix derived from the model in equations (1) through (6), along with 
instructions and reporting materials. (See Appendix C through 
Appendix G). Subjects will be asked not to di$cuss what they are 
doing among themselves. In the instructions, an attempt will be 
made to avoid the use of words such as game, play, competition, or 
rivals. 
The matrix which will be given to each subject tells him what his 
profits will be ~epending on his choice of price and advertising 
budget and his rival's choice of price and advertising budget. 
The subjects choose a price and advertising budget simultaneously 
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with their opponent. Subjects who are in the same market will be 
in different rooms. These choices are collected, and profits for 
each subject are computed. The outcome of their decisions is then 
communicated back to the subjects and they are asked to make new 
price and advertising budget choices. The process will be repeated 
about twenty times with an expected time for the entire game being 
I 
90 minutes to 120 minutes. 'Data from approximately the eighth to the 
eighteenth rounds will be used in testing hypotheses in order to 
control for learning effects and end effects. 
After the games have been completed, S values .can be computed 
for each round of the game. The value of S for player one can be 
obtained by substituting the. appropriate values for P 1 , P 2 , A1 , 
and A2 in equation (15) and then solving for S. 
2 A P1 + b P2 + d Al+ e A2 + f - a g s = ~~~__;.c..-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
- b (P 2 - g) 
Low and High Risk Games 
Games will be held on two different evenings. On the first 
(19) 
evening, the game will proceed as described above. On the second 
evening, an element of risk will be added. The subjects will be told 
that there is a chance for any given advertising campaign to be 
very successful or very unsuccessful. Rounds of these games will 
be chosen at random in which profits will be higher or lower than 
is indicated by the subject's profit matrix. Subjects will be 
informed of this possibility in their instruction sheets. The 
proportion of increase or decrease in profits will be determined in 
part by the advertising budget chosen for that round by the subject 
and in part by chance. 
To sunnnarize, two versions of the same game will be played: 
one with no risk except that presented by a competitor and one with 
additional risk added through success or failure of advertising 
campaigns. Subjects with high, medium, and low SRP scores will 
participate in both types of games. 
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis to be considered is that S values for 
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each player will converge to some value between -1 and +1, against 
the null hypothesis that Swill take on any possible value at random. 
In general terms, this hypothesis simply states that subjects will 
be able to make some sense out of the game, as S vilues which are 
less than -1 or greater than +1 are not rational. 
The second hypothesis is that risk averters will have higher S 
values and higher advertising budgets than risk lovers, against the 
null hypothesis that advertising budgets and S values will not be 
related to SRP scores. Those subjects who dislike taking risks can 
be expected to play the game in a more cooperative manner than 
those who are willing to take risks. By playing with higher S 
values, risk averters are insuring against retaliation from their 
competitor. 
The relationship between attitude toward risk and level of 
advertising can be looked at in two different ways. It is possible 
that those who dislike taking risks may be unwilling to gamble 
making large advertising expenditures, as they may feel that if 
their competitor also makes large advertising expenditures, gains 
from these large expenditures will be small. On the other hand, it 
is more likely that those who dislike risk may feel that, by always 
making large advertising expenditures, they are going to be able to 
minimize their competitor's profits while maximizing their own. 
Risk lovers are more apt to be willing to take the chance that 
their competitor will outspend them on advertisin.g. They are more 
willing to gamble low advertising budgets, the results of which are 
apt to be more variable. 
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The final hypothesis to be considered is that. both risk averters 
and risk lovers playing in the high risk game will have significantly 
different advertising budgets and S values than those of subjects 
playing in the low risk game. The c9rresponding null hypothesis is 
that those subjects playing in the high risk game will have the 
same advertising budgets and S values as subjects playing in the 
low risk game. No directional change for S values and advertising 
budgets from the low to the high risk game is indicated. Little 
research has been done in this area on which to base reasoning behind 
a directional difference. A priori reasoning can lead one in both 
directions, with seemingly valid arguments in favor of a change in 
either direction. 
This chapter has presented a general description of the design 
of the experiment. The actual procedures used in administering the 
experiment are described in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
PROCEDURES 
Before the Experiment 
The Profit Table 
The profit table (Appendix G) was derived from equations (1) 
through (6), p. 24, with a= -1,000, b = 600, d = 2, e = -1, 
f = 1,400, and g = 2. These constants were chosen, in part, by a 
trial and error method. The problem was to choose constants which 
resulted in non-negative values for P1 , P2 , A1 , and A2 at relevant 
values of S. Also, P1 , P2, A1 , and A2 had to be reasonable in an 
economic sense. Values for P1 , P2, and some of the constants were 
found by setting S equal to -1, O, and 1 in equations (15) and (16). 
By experimenting with fixed values for A1 and A2, and the remainder 
of the constants, values were computed for P1 , P2, and for some 
constants which were satisfactory. 
Where the model yielded x1 and x2 less than O, X = 0 was used. 
With this profit table, an average rate of return.was expected to 
be between $1.50 and $2.00 an hour. 
Table I presents prices and advertising budgets for three 
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After the profit table and other experimental materials (small 
reporting sheets, record sheet for the subject to keep trace of his 
profits and decisions, and instructions, reproduced in Appendix C 
through Appendix G) had been prepared, a trial run of the game was 
held, using eight volunteers. Ten rounds were completed in less 
than one hour, including time for explanations and instructions. 
Profits ~arned.(although not paid) ranged from about one dollar an 
hour to a little over two dollars an hour. The participants felt 
that the game was easy to understand and was enjoyable to play. 
Subjects 
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Subjects for the experiment were recrµited from business classes, 
math classes, Accounting Club, and Business Administration Club at 
Northeast Missouri State University. Recruiting was done by.handing 
out announcements (Appendix B) at class meetings and club meetings. 
Students who wished to respond to the announcement were referred to 
an office on campus where they could pick up copies of the SRP test, 
sign up for one of the two evenings on which the experiment was to 
be administered, and return the SRP test. The SRP test was referred 
to as a questionnaire. SRP tests were to be returned by Friday 
preceding the week in which the experiment was to be administered, 
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Fifty students signed up, 30 for Monday when the low risk game 
was to be administered, and 20 for Wednesday when the high risk game 
was to be administered. Twenty-seven subjects reported on Monday and 
16 on Wednesday. Fift~en of the subjects were female and 28 were male. 
Pairings 
From scores on SRP tests, pairings were made from high, medium 
and low scores. SRP scores from 6.33 up were called high. Those 
between 5.00 and 6.33 were called medium. A score of 5.00 or less 
was called low. Three each of the following pairings were set up for 
Monday evening as well as two each for Wednesday: high with high, 
high with medium, high with low, low with low, and low with medium. 
The scores on the SRP test ranged from a high of 8.83 to a low 
of 3. 33. The distribution of scores is given in Table II. 
TABLE II 
DISTRIBUTION OF SRP SCORES 
Range 
8.00 - 9.00 
7.00 - 8.00 
6. 00 - 7. 00 · 
5.00 - 6.00 
4.00 - 5.00 
3.00 - 4.00 







After pairings were made, each subject's name was associated 
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with a number on a master list of names with numbers one and two being 
competitors, three and four competing, and so on. Cards were made 
out with a number and room number, odd numbers being assigned to one 
room and even numbers .to another. 
Procedures 
General Procedures 
Subjects had been asked to report by 7 P.M. to the same office 
where they had returned their questionnaires. Previous to this, the 
class rooms where subjects were to be sent for the experiment had 
been set up with an instruction sheet, recording materials, and a 
profit table placed on each desk. 
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As subjects reported to the office, their names were crossed off 
the master list. They were given a card and told their number. They 
were sent to the appropriate room. When all subjects had reported, 
a monitor went to each room and asked them .to sit in numerical order 
(1, 3, 5, ••• ) in order to facilitate collection of decisions. 
Subjects were then asked if they had read the instructions and if they 
had any questions, This was done simultaneously in the two rooms. 
The monitors who did this in the two rooms had.discussed how to answer 
possible questions so that subjects in both rooms would be given 
comparable information. In addition to the information in the instruc-
tion sheets, subjects were reminded that they could not lose any of 
their own money, that they would be paid at the end of the game, and 
that their competitor was in a different room. Subjects were given 
an example of use of the profit table. They were told that the 
profit tables for the other firm in their market were similar to their 
own. Then subjects were asked to make their first decisions. 
Computation of profits as well as picking up and returning 
reporting sheets was done by two students, a secretary, the author's 
spouse and the author, all referred to as monitors. After the 
pairings from the SRP tests had been made, five large record sheets 
had been prepared with spaces for two or three pairs of competitors. 
These sheets contained columns for price and advertising decisions, 
profits and a running total of profits for each competitor. Each 
of the five monitors was responsible for orte sheet. 
Subjects were not monitored at all times. However, they had 
been asked in the instructions not to discuss the game among them-
selves, and little discussion seemed to take place. This situation 
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is a middle ground between other experiments in whic.h each subject was 
physically isolated from others (8) and those in which subjects 
were given materials several days before the actual experiment took 
place and were not cautioned in any way against discussing the experi-
ment with other subjects (2). 
After profits for the first round had been computed and recorded, 
the reporting slips showing the subject's profit and that of the other 
firm in his market were returned. Subjects were asked to make new 
choices and the process was repeated. At the end of the third round, 
subjects were asked if they had any questions. Subjects were paid 
their profits starting with the fourth round. 
Low Risk Game Procedures 
On Monday evening, an odd number of subjects reported, so one 
of the monitors played against one of the subjects. The information 
from this market was not used in the experiment, but the subject was 
treated like all other subjects and was paid. As not all of the 
subjects who had signed up for the experiment reported to play, a 
few changes in pairings had to be made at the last minute. 
Subjects were told after the eighteenth round that the next 
round would be the final one. Play had lasted from about 7:15 
until 8:45. After profits were computed for the last round, 
monitors took their record sheets into the rooms where subjects 
were waiting. Each of the monitors had been given signed checks 
made out to the subjects for whom they had been computing profits. 
Monitors checked profit totals with each of the subjects. If the 
subject had made profits of less than a dollar for the evening, his 
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check was made out for one dollar. Subjects were also told the number 
of their competitor. 
High Risk Game Procedures 
The high risk session on Wednesday evening followed the procedure 
for Monday evening. Instructions f.or the high risk session contained 
a paragraph not included in the instructions for the low risk game: 
To make this simulated business environment 
more realistic, you will occasionally encounter a situation 
in which your advertising campaign is very successful or 
very unsuccessful. In these cases your profits will be 
much higher or lower than is indicated on the profit sheet. 
There is no way.of you knowing when such a situation will 
occur. In these cases, the difference between the profits 
you actually receive and those shown on the profit sheet is 
determined in part by the size of your advertising budget 
and in part by chance {Appendix C). 
This aspect was emphasized in oral instructions given to the subjects. 
Other oral and written instructions to subjects were exactly like 
those given to subjects playing in the low risk game, 
Again, a few changes had to be made in pairings at the last 
minute as not all subjects reported. However, an even number did 
report so that data from all subjects could be used. 
The following rounds were chosen in which profits differed 
from those shown on the profit table: 2, 3, 7, 12, 16, 17, and 19. 
Profits received were computed by: 
profits received= profits shown+ r A (20) 
with r taking the values 2, -7, 9, -4, 3, 7, -8, for rounds 2, 3, 
7, 12, 16, 17, and 19 respectively. These values of r were chosen 
partly at random from integers from -10 to +10 and partly in such a 
way that, if subjects always chose the same value of A for these 
rounds, the sum of profit deviations would be slightly greater 
than 0. 
After the nineteenth round, subjects were told that the next 
round would be the last. Play lasted from about 7:15 until 8:30. 
After the Game 
Average payoff for the evening for the low risk game was 
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$2.29 with a high of $3.48 and a low of $.57. A~erage payoff for 
the high risk game was $1.88 with a high of $4.62 and a low of $0.00. 
All checks were cashed within a few days, even those for one dollar. 
Following the experiments, data was collected and sorted. 
Subjects had been asked to leave all materials in the rooms following 
the experiment, so several checks on accuracy of data were available, 
including monitor's work sheets, reporting slips, and subject's work 
sheets. Data was then recorded with each subject's information going 
on one sheet, including price decisions, advertising decisions, profits 





The social scientist working with data from an experiment 
is faced with two broad types of statistical tests available for 
testing hypotheses: parametric and nonparametric. Data 
measured in nominal or ordinal scales should be analyzed by non-
parametric methods in order to obtain valid conclusions. Data 
measured in interval or ratio scales may be analyzed using either 
parametric or nonparametric methods. In addition, parametric tests 
are derived from models specifying certain conditions about the 
parameters of the population from which the research sample is drawn. 
The meaningfulness of parametric tests depends, then, on the validity 
of assumptions which the researcher must make concerning parameters 
(29, p. 19). 
Siegel (29) lists the condit.ions upon which a parametric 
statistical test is bas.ed: 
1. The observations must be independent. That is, 
the selection of any one case from the population 
for inclusion in the sample must not bias the chance of 
any other case for inclusion, and the, score which is 
assigned to any case must not bias the score which is 
assigned to any other case. 
2. The observations must be drawn from normally 
distributed populations. 
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3. These populations must have the same variance 
(or, in special cases, they must have a known ratio 
of variances). 
4. The variables involved must have been measured 
in at least an interval scale, so that it is possible 
to ~e the operations of arithmetic (adding, dividing, 
finding means, etc.) on the scores (p. 19). 
For these reasons, (in particular number 4, but also to escape 
doubts about 1, 2, and 3) nonparametric tests have been used in 
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testing the data derived from the experiment described in Chapter IV. 
Both the SRP scores and the restriction of advertising choices to 
$0, $100, and $200 tend to limit choice of tests to nonparametric 
methods. 
Data Organization 
Data sheets, one for each subject, were divided into four 
groups, according to SRP scores and high or low risk game. SRP 
scores of 6.00 or more were labeled high while those below 6.00 were 
called low. Nine subjects playing in the high risk game had high 
SRP scores. Seven subjects playing in the high risk game had low 
SRP scores. Of those subjects playing in the low risk game, twelve 
had high SRP scores and fourteen had low SRP scor~s. Data from round 
seven through round sixteen was used from both games. 
Statistical Tests 
Binomial Test 
The first test made, using the binomial test, was to test whether 
or not S values between -1 and +1 occurred more frequently than did 
S values greater than +1 or less than -1. Table III contains the 









S Less Than -1 
or Greater Than +1 
571 
91 




probability of 329 of 420 S values between -1 and +l occurring at 
random is less than .001 (29, pp. 41 and 247). 
Chi Square Test 
The chi-square test fork independent samples was used for the 
remaining statistical analysis. This test is used to determine the 
significance of the differences among k independent groups. Data 
frequencies are arranged in a k by r table. To test the null 
hypothesis that k samples of frequencies have come from the same or 
identical populations, the following formula is used: 
x2 = 
k r 2 
E E (Oij - Eij) 
i=l j=l (21) 
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where 0 .. is the observed number of cases in the ith row of the jth 
1] 
column and E .. is the number of cases expected. E .. is computed 
~ ~ 
by multiplying the appropriate marginal totals from the k by r table 
and dividing by the total number of cases. Degrees of freedom for 
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the chi-square test are equal to (r - 1) (k - 1) (29, pp. 105 and 175). 
The chi-square test may be used in cases where frequencies in 
the k by r table are not too small. Siegel cites the rule that 
where 'degrees of freedom are larger than one, fewer than 20 percent 
of the cells should have an expected frequency of less than five, 
and no cells should have an expected frequency of less than one. If 
these requirements are not met, categories must be combined in order 
to meaningfully apply the chi-square test (29, p. 110). 
The chi-square test was applied to differences in price choices, 
advertising choices, S values, and profits between risk averters 
and risk lovers in the low risk game, between risk averters and risk 
lovers in the high risk game, between risk averters playing in the 
low risk game and the high risk game, and between risk lovers playing 
in the low risk game and the high risk game. Thus, sixteen tests 
were made, four each concerning profits, advertising budgets, S 
values, and prices. 
Results 
Tables IV through XI in Appendix H give information used in 
computing the chi-square statistic in each case,. as well as the 
information presented in percentage form and significance levels 
for each situation. 
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Tables IV and V present the distribution of prices chosen by 
risk averters and risk lovers who played in the two games. In order 
to follow the rule concerning number of frequencies required per cell, 
price choices of 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 were combined, as were those of 2.8, 
2.9, and 3.0. The results indicate that risk averters and risk lovers 
did choose prices differently from each other, both in the high 
risk game and the low risk game. But prices chosen by risk averters 
were only slightly affected by the game in which subjects partici-
pated. This is also the case with risk lovers. 
The same pattern does not hold true for advei:;tising choices, 
as can he seen in Tables VI and VII, Appendix H. Here choice of 
advertising budget was significantly different at the .05 level 
between risk averters and risk lovers in the low risk game. Risk 
lovers made advertising choices which were significantly different 
at the .001 levels between the low risk and high risk games. Similarly 
risk averters chose advertising budgets differently between the two 
games, also with a significance level of .001. Thus, it seems that 
subjects treated advertising choices differently than price choices. 
Tables VIII and IX in Appendix H deal with S values. Very little 
difference in S values computed from play of risk averters and risk 
lovers was found. Also, risk averters played in such a way as to 
result in only slightly different S value distributions in the low 
risk game versus the high risk game. However, risk lovers did 
change strategies, rather dramatically, in such a way to result 
in a difference, significant at the .01 level, in S values between 
the high and low risk games. 
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Tables X and XI refer to profits. First, it is interesting to 
note that the high risk game resulted in more widely dispersed profits 
for both risk lovers and risk averters than did the low risk game. 
In the low risk game, risk averters and risk lovers made profits which 
were significantly different at the • 05 level. However, there was 
no significant difference in profits made by risk averters and risk 
lovers in the high risk game. There were large differences in 
profits between the two games for risk lovers, as there were for risk 
averters, both significant at a level of .001. 
Interpretation of Results 
Hypothesis One 
How does this information relate to the hypotheses stated in 
Chapter IV? Hypothesis one is that S values will converge, for each 
player, to some level between -1 and +1. This hypothesis must be 
rejected. As a crude test of this hypothesis, it was found that 
no significant difference existed between the number of S values 
which were between -1 and +l in the first half of round seven through 
round sixteen and the S values between -1 and +1 in the second half 
of those rounds, in either game. However, by far more values were 
between -1 and +l proportionately, than were less than -1 or greater 
than +l. 
Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis two was stated as follows: Risk averters will have 
higher S values and higher advertising budgets than risk lovers. As 
,,. 
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far as S values are concerned, there is no significant difference 
between S values of risk lovers and risk averters in either the low 
risk game or the high risk game. In the high risk game, advertising 
choices were only slightly different between risk averters and risk 
lovers. In the low risk game, the distribution of advertising choices 
was significantly different, but not in the direction hypothesized. 
Rather, risk averters had more advertising choices of $0 and $200, 
while risk lovers had more advertising choices of $100. 
Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis three, that both risk averters and risk lovers 
playing in the high risk game will have significantly different 
advertising budgets and S values than those of subjects playing in 
the low risk game can be more readily accepted. S values of risk 
lovers were significantly different in the two games, as were 
advertising choices. Risk averters' S values were only slightly 
different (the difference being significant at the .20 level) but 
their advertising choices were significantly different in the two 
games. For S values of risk lovers, the difference seems to be in the 
distribution, rather than in more high or low values. Both risk 
lovers and risk averters had more advertising choices of $200 in the 
low risk game than in the high risk game. 
Additional Information 
Some additional useful information can be gleaned from the data. 
First, subjects did seem to be able to handle the complicated format 
fof the game. It is possible that their S values did not begin to 
converge to any particular value because the subjects were not given 
time to play enough rounds of the game. On the other hand, it is 
possible that the game was such that subjects would continue to try 
to better their positions, thus, not settling on any one strategy, 
even after many rounds of play. 
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No hypotheses were formulated concerning prices. Risk averters 
chose lower prices, by far,'than did risk lovers. In the low risk 
game, risk lovers chose prices of 2.6 or more 52% of the time, while 
risk averters chose prices of 2.6 or more 37% of the time. In the high 
risk game, prices of 2.6 or more were chosen by risk lovers in 41% of 
the cases, but only in 25% of the cases by risk averters. 
Of the sixteen chi-square tests performed, nine were significant 
at the .05 level or better, while seven were not. Differences 
between risk averters and risk lovers in the low risk game were 
significant for prices, advertising choices, and profits. Price was 
the only variable with significant differences between risk lovers 
and risk averters in the high risk game. Risk lovers had significant 
differences in S values, advertising c:hoices; and profits between 
the low and high risk games, while risk averters had significant 
differences in advertising choices and profits between the two games. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Do subjects with different attitudes toward risk choose different 
I 
I 
strategies in a business game? How do subjects with different 
attitudes toward risk react under varied levels of risk? These 
are the questions to which this study is addressed. 
The business game used is a duopoly situation with subjects 
making price and advertising budget choices. The level of risk is 
varied through results of advertising budgets. An index of competitive-
ness, S, and a measure of risk attitude, SRP scores, are used. 
Results 
Some information was gained through statistical analysis of 
data generated by the experiment. First, subjects were able to 
handle the relatively complicated game. Second, the SRP test was 
successful in discriminating between subjects who behaved differently 
as far as prices, advertising choices, and profits were concerned 
in the low risk game. However, this discriminatory ability broke 
down in the high risk game in every case but that of prices. The 
SRP scores did not discriminate between different S values for 
either game. One possible reason is that pairings were made such 
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that both high and low SRP scorers played against each other. The 
values are computed using both the choices of the subject under 
question and those of his opponent. 
One interesting possible conclusion which should be considered 
is that, as risk increases, subjects, both risk avetters and risk 
lovers, tend to behave in a more erratic fashion. Both types of 
subjects significantly changed their advertising choices in the high 
risk game relative to the low risk game, while price choices did not 
significantly change between the two types of game of either risk 
lovers or risk averters. 
Organization of Experiments 
A researcher who wishes to work with experimental economics 
might benefit from some technical points apparent in this paper. 
First, hypotheses should have been formulated to follow more closely 
statistical methods available. Also, hypothesis one was not worded 
properly to reflect what was actually intended to be tested by it. 
The question of how detailed hypotheses formulation should be 
remains unclear. 
From the conduct of this experiment it seems that the number of 
subjects participating in an experiment at any one time should. be 
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kept small in order to facilitate the administration of the experiment. 
Subjects should not be rushed in making decisions, but neither should 
they be forced to wait long periods of tillle between rounds. Amount 
of time needed to compute profits for each round varied significantly 
between the low risk game, with twenty-seven subjects, and the high 
risk game, with sixteen subjects, even though profit computation was 
more complicated on several rounds in the high risk game. Many such 
problems can be solved only by repeated work in the area. 
Suggestions for Further Work 
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This experiment opens up suggestions for further work in two 
areas. First, some additional research on the SRP test could be 
done. Some items need to be rewritten. For example, "Mr. C, a 
married man with two children, has a steady job that pays him about 
$6,000 per year," no longer implies that the man is making a com-
fortable wage. Also, additional situations should be constructed, 
and an attempt made to do an item analysis on·the questions already 
in the test as well as new possibilities. Some other possible method 
of scoring the SRP test should be investigated, Presently, the only 
score is the mean of answers on the twelve questions. A possible 
topic for investigation is the distribution of each subject's answers 
on the test. 
In the area of experimental economics, the experiment presented 
here could be repeated profitably with varied levels of risk in the 
high risk game, in the form of different distributions of rounds 
with results which vary from the profit table, as well as different 
distributions of possible profit deviations. 
Many other types of economic experimental games could be 
investigated. One intriguing possibility if a game designed to 
test differences in the behavior of subjects acting as managers and 
as owners in making decisions. Another possibility is an investi-
gation, on a subject-by-subject basis, of types of strategies used 
in a simple economic game compared with game the.ory strategies. 
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This questionnaire is made up of twelve different situations. 
You are to read each situation and "advise" the person who is faced 
with the situation by answering a multiple choice type question. 
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. 
Please answer each of the twelve questions. Give only one 
answer. Consider each situation separately from the others. Take 
your time. There is no time limit. 
1. Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is married and has one 
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child, has been working for a large electronics corporation since 
graduation from college five years ago. He is assured of a lifetime 
job with a modest, though adequate, salary, and liberal pension 
benefits upon retirement. On the other hand, it is very unlikely 
that his salary will increase much before he retires. While attending 
a convention, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded 
company which has a highly ,uncertain future. The new job would pay 
more to start and would offer the possibility of a share in the 
ownership if the company survived the competition of the larger firms. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of the new company's proving financially sound. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. A TO TAKE THE NEW JOB. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove 
financially sound. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will prove 
financially sound. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the company will prove 
financially sound. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. A should not take the 
new job no matter what the probabilities. 
2. Mr. B, a 45 year-old accountant, has recently been informed by 
his physician that he has developed a severe heart ailment. The 
disease would be sufficiently serious to force Mr. B to change many 
of his strongest life habits--reducing his work load, drastically 
changing his diet, giving up favorite leisure-time pursuits. The 
physician suggests that a delicate medical operation could be 
attempted which, if successful, would completely relieve the heart 
condition. But its success could not be assured, and in fact, the 
operation might prove fatal. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. B. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of the operation being a success. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. B TO UNDERGO THE OPERATION. 
~~ Place a check here if you think Mr. B should~ undergo the 
operation no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the operation will succeed. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the operation will succeed. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the operation will succeed. 
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The chances are 3 in 10 that the operation will succeed. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the operation will succeed. 
3. Mr. C, a married man with two children, has a ~teady job that 
pays him about $6000 per year. He can easily afford the necessities 
of life, but few of the luxuries. Mr. C's father, who died recently, 
carried a $4000 life insurance policy. Mr. C would like to invest 
this money in stocks. He is well aware of the secure "blue-chip" 
stocks and bonds that would pay approximately 6% on his investment. 
On the other hand, Mr.Chas heard that the stocks of a relatively 
unknown company X might double their present value if a new product 
currently in production is favorably received by the buying public. 
However, if the product is unfavorably received, the stocks would 
decline in value. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. C. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of the product being favorably received. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. C TO BUY STOCK IN COMPANY X. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the product is favorably received. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the product is favorably received. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the product is favorably r.eceived. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the product is favorably received. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the product is favorably received. 
~~ Place a check here if you think Mr. C should not buy the stock 
in company X no matter what the probabilities. 
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4. Mr.Dis the captain of College S's football team. College Sis 
playing its traditional rival, College R, in'the final game of the 
season. The game is in its final seconds, and Mr. D's team, College S, 
is behind in the score. College S has time to run one more play. 
Mr. D, the captain, must decide whether it would be best to settle 
for a tie score with a play which would be almost certain to work; or, 
on the other hand, should he try a more complicated and risky play 
which could bring victory if it succeeded, but defeat if not. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. D. Listed bdlow are several 
probabilities or odds of the complicated play succeeding. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. D TO CHOOSE THE COMPLICATED 
PLAY. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. D should not choose the 
complicated play no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the complicated play will succeed, 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the complicated play will succeed. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the complicated play will succeed, 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the complicated play will succeed. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the complicated play will succeed. 
5, Mr. E i:.s president of a light metals corporation in the United 
States. The corporation is quite prosperous, and has strongly 
considered the possibilities of business expansion by building an 
additional plant in a new location. The choice is between building 
another plant in the United States, where there would be a moderate 
return on the initial investment, or building a plant in a foreign 
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country. Lower labor costs and easy access to raw materials in 
that country would mean a much higher return on th2 initial investment. 
On the other hand, there is a history of political instability and 
revolution in the foreign country under consideration. In fact, the 
leader of a small minority party is committed to nationalizing, 
that is, taking over all foreign investments. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. E. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of the foreign country's political situation 
remaining stable. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. E TO BUILD THE PLANT IN 
THE FOREIGN COUNTRY. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the country will remain stable. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the country will remain stable. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the country will remain stable. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the country will remain stable. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. E should not build the plant 
in the foreign country no matter what the probabilities. 
6. Mr. Fis currently a college senior who is very eager to pursue 
graduate study in chemistry leading to the Ph.D. degree. He has been 
accepted by both University X and University Y. University X has 
a world-wide reputation for excellence in chemistry. While a 
degree from University X would signify outstanding training in this 
field, the standards are so very rigorous that only a fraction of 
the degree candidates actually receive the degree. University Y, 
on the. other hand, has much less of a reputation in chemistry, but 
almost everyone admitted is awarded the Ph.D. degree, though the 
degree has much less prestige than the corresponding degree from 
University X. 
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Imagine that you are advising Mr. F. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of Mr. F successfully completing his studies at 
University X. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. F TO ATTEND UNIVERSITY X. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. F should not attend 
University X no matter what the probabilities. 
~~ The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. F will get a Ph.D. degree at 
University X. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. F will get a Ph.D. degree at 
University X. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. F will get a Ph.D. degree at 
University X. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. F will get a Ph.D. degree at 
University X. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. F will get a Ph.D. degree at 
University X. 
7. Mr. G, a competent chess player, is participating in a national 
chess tournament. In an early match he draws the top-favored 
player in the tournament as his opponent. Mr. G has been given 
a relatively low ranking in view of his performance in previous 
tournaments. During the course of his play with the top-favored 
man, Mr. G notes the possibility of a deceptive though risky maneuver 
which might bring him a quick victory. At the same time, if the 
attempted maneuver should fail, Mr. G would be left in an exposed 
position, and defeat would almost certainly follow. 
Imagine you are advising Mr. G. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of the maneuver being successful. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. G TO ATTEMPT THE MANEUVER. 
The chances are 1 in 10 of the maneuver being successful. 
The chances are 3 in 10 of the maneuver being successful. 
The chances are 5 in 10 of the maneuver being successful. 
The chances are 7 in 10 of the maneuver being successful. 
The chances are 9 in 10 of the maneuver being successful. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. G should not try the 
maneuver no matter what the probabilities. 
8. Mr. H, a college senior, has studied the piano since childhood. 
He has won amateur prizes and given small recitals, suggesting that 
Mr. H has considerable musical talent. As graduation approaches, 
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Mr. H has the choice of going to medical school to become a physician, 
a profession which would bring certain prestige and financial rewards, 
or entering a conservatory of music for advanced training with a 
well-known pianist. Mr. H realizes that even upon completion of 
his piano studies, which would take many more years and a lot of 
money, success as a concert pianist would not be assured. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. H. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of Mr. H "making it big" as a musician. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. H TO PURSUE A CAREER 
IN MUSIC. 
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Place a check here if you think Mr. H should not pursue a career 
in music no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. H will make it big as a musician. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. H will make it big as a musician. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. H will make it big as a musician. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. H will make it big as a musician. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. H will make it big as a musician. 
9. Mr. J is an American captured by the enemy in World War II and 
placed in a prisoner-of-war camp. Conditions in the camp are quite 
bad, with long hours of hard physical labor and a barely sufficient 
diet. After spending several months in this camp, Mr. J notes the 
possibility of escape by concealing himself in a supply truck that 
shuttles in and out of camp. Of course, there is no guarantee that 
the escape would prove successful. Recapture by the enemy could well 
mean execution. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. J. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of Mr. J not getting caught. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. J TO ATTEMPT THE ESCAPE. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. J will not get caught. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. J will not get caught. • 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. J will not get caught. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. J will not get caught. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. J will not get caught. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. J should not attempt to 
escape no matter what the probabilities. 
10. Mr. K is a successful businessman who has participated in a 
number of civic activities of considerable value to the community. 
Mr. K has been approached by the leaders of his political party as 
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a possible congressional candidate in the next election. Mr. K's 
party is a minority party in the district, though _the party has won 
occasional elections in the past. Mr. K would like to hold political 
office, but to do so would involve a serious financial sacrifice, 
since the party has insufficient campaign funds. He would also have 
to endure the attacks of his political opponents in a hot campaign. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. K. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of Mr. K winning the election. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. K TO RUN FOR OFFICE. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. K should not run for office 
no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. K will win the election. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. K will win the election. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. K.will win the election. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. K will win .the election. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. K will win the election. 
11. Mr. L, a married 30-year-old research physicist, has been given 
a 5-year appointment by a major university laboratory. As he 
contemplates the next 5 years, he realizes that he might work on a 
difficult long-term problem which, if a solution could be found, 
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would resolve basic scientific issues in the field and bring scientific 
honors. If no solution were found, however, Mr. L would have little 
to show for his 5 years in the laboratory, and this would make it 
hard for him to get a good job afterwards. On the other hand, he 
could, as most of his professional associates are doing, work on a 
series of short-term problems whe~e solutions would be easier to 
find, but where the problems are of lesser scientific importance. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. L. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of Mr. L solving the long-term problem. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. L TO TRY THE LONG-TERM 
PROBLEM. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. L will solve the long-term 
problem. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. L will solve the long-term 
problem. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. L will solve the long-term 
problem. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. L will solve the long-term 
problem. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. L will solve the long-term 
problem. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. L should not try to solve 
the long-term problem no matter what the probabilities. 
12. Mr.Mis contemplating marriage to Miss T, a girl whom he has 
known for a little more than a year. Recently, however, a number of 
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arguments have occurred between them, suggesting some sharp dif-
ferences of opinion in the way each views certain matters. Indeed, 
they decide to seek professional advice from a marriage counselor as 
to whether it would be wise for them to marry. On the basis of these 
meetings with a marriage counselor, they realize that a happy marriage, 
while possible, would n.ot be assured. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. M. Listed below are several 
probabilities of their marriage being a happy one. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. M TO MARRY MISS T. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. M should not marry Miss T 
no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the marriage will be happy. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the marriage will be happy. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the marriage will be happy. 
The chances are 3 in 10 the marriage will be happy. 
The chances are 1 in 10 the marriage will be happy. 
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WANTED: PEOPLE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN A RESEARCH 
PROJECT IN DECISION MAKING 
PARTICIPANTS WILL BE PAID. The amount you receive will 
depend on your decisions. 
REQUIREMENTS: 1. Fill out a questionnaire and return it 
ahead of time. 
2 •. Participate in the project for 
approximately two hours. 
Questionnaires can be picked up in VH 286 from Dr. Weber. 
Return them to VH 286 by March 22, at the latest. 
The actual project will be carried out Monday, March 25, 
7 to 9 p.m., and Wednesday, March 27, 7 to 9 p.m. 
Participants have their choice of dates. When you return 
the questionnaire, sign up for the date you prefer. 
Report to VH 286 by 7 p.m. on Monday or Wednesday. Participants 
will be given a simulated business environment and will be 
asked to make choices between various simple pricing and 
advertising policies. 
If you have questions, call 665-5121, ext. 2758, or 665-5023. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to take part in a project which has been designed 
to allow you to earn an appreciable amount of money. The amount 
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you earn will be determined by how carefully you follow instructions, 
and by your decisions in a number of situations. You will keep all 
the money you earn. You cannot lose your own money, but poor deci-
sions will result in little or no profit to you. 
You are going to be in the role of a businessman, and we are 
going to provide you with a simulated business environment. You 
and one other businessman are producers of similar products which 
you sell in the same market. In each time period you and the 
other seller in your market must make decisions as to the price 
you want to charge for your product and the amount of money you 
want to spend on advertising. 
You have been given a profit table which shows the amount of 
money you will earn for each price and advertising budget combina-
tion you choose. Notice that the amount you earn depends not only 
on your price and ~dvertising budget decisions, BUT ALSO ON THOSE 
OF THE OTHER SELLER IN YOUR MARKET. For example, if you choose an 
advertising budget of $100 and a price of 2.3, your profit will be 
11¢ if the other seller in your market chooses an advertising budget 
of $100 and a price of 2.5. But your profit will be 1¢ if he chooses 
an advertising budget of $200 and a price of 2.1. 
We will go through two practice rounds, for which there will be 
no profit or loss, to make sure you understand what you are to do. 
You may ask questions at any time during these rounds. Then we 
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will go through approximately twenty rounds. You will be notified of 
your profit~ at the end of each round. 
After you have made a decision as to price and advertising budget, 
record them on the small sheets and also on your master record sheet. 
The small sheets will be picked up, profits computed, and you will 
be informed of your profits at the end of each round. You are to 
record the amount of profit for each round on your master sheet also. 
Then the process will be repeated. 
When all rounds are completed you will be paid your profits in 
cash. You are to turn in all small sheets and your master record 
sheet at the end of the project. 
Please do not talk about your decisions with anyone else in 
the room. The other students in this room are selling in different 
markets. The other seller in your market is in another room. 
Please do not discuss the project with any of your friends. 
Projects will be running all week. These projects are different. 
Information you give anyone else may only confuse them and keep them 
from earning money. 
Are there any questions? 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to take part in a project which has been designed 
to allow you to earn an appreciable amount of money. The amount 
70 
you earn will be determined by how carefully you follow instructions, 
and by your decisions in a number of situations. You will keep all 
the money you earn. You cannot lose your own money, but poor decisions 
will result in little or no profit to you. 
You are going to be in the role of a businessman, and we are 
going to provide you with a simulated business environment. You and 
one other businessman are producers of similar products which you 
sell in the same market. In each time period you and the other 
seller in your market must make decisions as to the price you want 
to charge for your product and the amount of money you want to 
spend on advertising. 
You have been given a profit table which shows the amount of 
money you will earn for each price and advertising budget combination 
you choose. Notice that the amount of money you earn depends not 
only on your price and advertising budget decisions, BUT ALSO ON 
THOSE OF THE OTHER SELLER IN YOUR MARKET. For example, if you choose 
an advertising budget of $100 and a price of 2.3, your profit will be 
11¢ if the other seller in your market chooses an advertising budget 
of $100 and a price of 2.5. But your profit will be 1¢ if he chooses 
an advertising budget of $200 and a price of 2.1. 
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To make this simulated business environment more realistic, 
you will occasionally encounter a situation in which your advertising 
campaign is very successful or very unsuccessful. In these cases 
your profits will be much higher or much lower than is indicated on 
the profit sheets. There is no way of your knowing when such a 
situation will occur. In these cases, the difference between the 
profits you actually receive and those shown on the profit sheet 
is determined in part by the size of your advertising budget and 
in part by chance. 
We will go through two practice rounds, for which there will 
be no profit or loss, to make sure you understand what you are to do. 
You may ask questions at any time during these rounds. Then we will 
go through approximately twenty rounds. You will be notified of your 
profits at the end of each round. 
After you have made a decision as to price and advertising 
budget, record them on the small sheets and also on your master record 
sheet. The small sheets will be picked up, profits computed, and 
you will be informed of your profits at the end of each round. You 
are to record the amount of profit for each round on your master 
sheet also. Then the process will be repeated. 
When all rounds are completed you will be paid your profits in 
cash. You are to turn in all small sheets and your master record 
sheet at the end of the project. 
Please do not talk about your decisions with anyone else in the 
room. The other students in this room are selling in different 
markets. The other seller in your market is in another room. 
Please do not discuss the project with any of your friends. 
Projects will be running all week. These projects are different. 
Information you give anyone else may only confuse them and keep them 
from earning money. 
Are there any questions? 
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MASTER RECORD SHEET 
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YOUR PROFIT TABLE WHEN YOUR ADVERTISING BUDGET= $0 
Other 
Your Seller's Other Seller's Price 
Price Advertising 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 ,2.8 2.9 3.0 
2.1 0 6 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 10 11 
2.1 100 5 5 6 ·6 7 8 8 9 9 10 
2.1 200 4 4 5 5 6 7 7 8 8 9 
2.2 0 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 
2.2 100 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 
2.2 200 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 
2.3 0 11 13 14 16 18 20 22 23 25 27 
2.3 100 8 10 11 13 15 17 19 20 22 24 
2.3 200 5 7 8 10 12 14 16 17 19 21 
2.4 0 10 13 15 18 20 22 25 27 30 32 
2.4 100 6 9 11 14 16 18 21 23 26 28 
2.4 200 2 5 7 10 12 14 17 19 22 24 
2.5 0 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 
2.5 100 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
2.5 200 0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 
2.6 0 4 7 11 14 18 22 25 29 32 36 
2.6 100 0 1 5 8 12 16 19 23 26 30 
2.6 200 0 0 0 2 6 10 13 17 20 24 
2.7 0 0 1 6 10 14 18 22 27 31 35 
2.7 100 0 0 0 3 7 11 15 20 24 28 
2.7 200 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 13 17 21 
2.8 0 0 0 0 3 8 13 ],8 22 27 32 
2.8 100 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 14 19 24 
2.8 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 11 16 
2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 11 16 22 27 
2.9 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 13 18 
2.9 209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 
3.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 14 20 
3.0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 
3.0 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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YOUR PROFIT TABLE WHEN YOUR ADVERTISING BUDGET= $100 
Other 
Your Seller's Other Seller's Price 
Price Advertising 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 
2.1 0 -2 -2 -1 -1 0 1 1 2 2 3 
2.1 100 -3 -3 -2 -2 -1 0 0 1 1 2 
2.1 200 -4 -4 -3 -3 -2 -1 -1 0 0 1 
2.2 0 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 
2.2 100 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 
2.2 200 -1 0 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 
2.3 0 7 9 10 12 14 16 18 19 21 23 
2.3 100 4 6 7 9 11 13 15 16 18 20 
2.3 200 1 3 4 6 8 10 12 13 15 17 
2.4 0 8 11 13 16 18 20 23 25 28 30 
2.4 100 4 7 9 12 14 16 19 21 24 26 
2.4 200 0 3 5 8 10 12 15 17 20 22 
2.5 0 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 .35 
2.5 100 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
2.5 200 -2 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 
2.6 0 6 9 13 16 20 24 27 31 34 38 
2.6 100 0 3 7 10 14 18 21 25 28 32 
2.6 200 -6 -3 1 4 8 12 15 19 22 26 
2.7 0 1 5 10 14 18 22 26 31 35 39 
2.7 100 -6 -2 3 7 11 15 19 24 28 32 
2.7 200 -10 -9 -4 0 4 8 12 17 21 25 
2.8 0 -5 0 4 9 14 19 24 28 33 38 
2.8 100 -10 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 17 21 25 
2.8 200 -10 -10 -10 -7 -2 3 8 12 17 22 
2.9 0 -10 -8 -3 3 8 13 19 24 30 35 
2.9 100 -10 -10 -10 -6 -1 4 10 15 21 26 
2.9 200 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 ,..5 1 6 12 17 
3.0 0 -10 -10 -10 -6 0 6 12 18 24 30 
3.0 100 -10 --10 -10 -10 -10 -4 2 8 14 20 
3.0 200 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -8 -2 4 10 
81 
YOUR PROFIT TABLE WHEN YOUR ADVERTISING BUDGET= $200 
Other 
Your Seller's Other Seller's Price 
Price Advertising 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 
2.1 0 -10 -10 -9 -9 -8 -7 -7 -6 -6 -5 
2.1 100 -11 -11 -10 -10 -9 -8 -8 -7 -7 -6 
2.1 200 -12 -12 -11 -11 -10 -9 -9 -8 -8 -7 
2.2 0 -3 -2 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 
2.2 100 -5 -4 -2 -1 0 1 2 4 5 6 
2.2 200 -7 -6 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 4 
2.3 0 3 5 6 8 10 12 14 15 17 19 
2.3 100 0 2 3 5 7 9 11 12 14 16 
2.3 200 -3 -1 0 2 4 6 8 9 11 13 
2.4 0 6 9 11 14 16 18 21 23 26 28 
2.4 100 2 5 7 10 12 14 17 19 22 24 
2.4 200 -2 1 3 6 8 10 13 15 18 20 
2.5 0 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 
2.5 100 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
2.5 200 -2 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 
2.6 0 8 11 15 18 22 26 29 33 36 40 
2.6 100 2 5 9 12 16 20 23 27 30 34 
2.6 200 -4 -1 3 6 10 14 17 21 24 28 
2.7 0 5 9 14 18 22 26 30 35 39 43 
2.7 100 -2 2 7 11 15 19 23 28 32 36 
2.7 200 -9 -5 0 4 8 12 16 21 25 29 
2.8 0 1 6 10 15 20 25 30 34 39 43 
2.8 100 -7 -2 2 7 12 17 22 26 31 36 
2.8 200 -15 -10 -6 -1 4 9 14 18 23 28 
2.9 0 -6 0 5 11 16 21 27 32 38 43 
2.9 100 -15 -9 -4 2 7 12 18 23 29 34 
2.9 200 -20 -18 -13 -7 -2 3 9 14 20 25 
3.0 0 -14 -8 -2 4 10 16 22 28 34 40 
3.0 100 :....20 -18 -12 -6 0 6 12 18 24 30 






DISTRIBUTION OF PRICE FREQUENCIES 
Low Risk Game 
Prices 
2.1-2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8-3.0 Totals 
Risk Observed 10 27 38 28 11 6 120 
Averters Expected 10 23 32 41 12 3 
Risk Observed 12 23 32 60 12 1 140 
Lovers Expected 12 17 38 47 11 4 
Totals 22 50 70 88 23 7 260 
Significant difference in distributions at .01 level 
High Risk Game 
Prices 
2.1-2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8-3.0 Totals 
Risk Observed 10 31 26 13 9 1 90 
Averters Expected 13 23 24 29 9 1 
Risk Observed 14 10 17 21 7 1 70 
Lovers Expected 11 18 19 15 7 1 
Totals 24 41 43 34 16 2 160 
Significant difference in distributions at .05 level 
Risk Averters 
Prices 
2.1-2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8-3.0 Totals 
Low Risk Observed 10 27 38 28 11 6 120 
Game Expected 11 33 37 23 11 4 
High Risk Observed 10 31 26 13 9 1 90 
Game Expected 9 25 27 18 9 3 
Totals 20 58 64 41 20 7 210 
Significant difference in distributions at .20 level 
84 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Risk Lovers 
Prices 
2.1-2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8-3.0 Totals 
Low Risk Observed 12 23 32 60 12 1 140 
Game Expected 17 22 33 54 13 1 
High Risk Observed 14 10 17 21 7 1 70 
Game Expected 9 11 16 27 6 1 
Totals 26 33 49 81 19 2 210 





Low Risk Game 
High Risk Game 
Low Risk Game 
High Risk Game 
TABLE V 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF 
PRICE FREQUENCIES 
Low Risk Game 
Prices 
2.1-2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 
.08 .22 • 32 .23 .09 
.09 .16 • 23 .42 .09 
High Risk Game 
Prices 
2.1-2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 
.11 • 34 .29 .14 .10 
.20 .14 .24 • 30 .10 
Risk Averters 
Prices 
2.1-2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 
.08 .22 .32 .23 .09 
.11 .34 .29 .14 .10 
Risk Lovers 
Prices 
2.1-2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 
.09 .16 .23 .42 .09 















DISTRIBUTION OF ADVERTISING 
BUDGET FREQUENCIES 
Low Risk Game 
Advertising Choices 
$0 $100 $200 Totals 
Risk Averters Observed 33 19 68 120 
Expected 27 27 66 
Risk Lovers Observed 26 40 74 140 
Expected 32 32 76 
Totals 59 59 142 260 
Significant difference in distributions at .02 level 
High Risk Game 
Advertising Choices 
$0 $100 $200 Totals 
Risk Averters Observed 25 40 25 90 
Expected 22 45 23 
Risk Lovers Obs '.rved 14 40 16 70 
Exp ,cted 17 35 18 
Significant differe1ce in distributions at .25 level 
Risk Averters 
Advertising Choices 
$0 $100 $200 Totals 
Low Risk Game Observed 33 19 68 120 
Expected 33 34 53 
High Risk Game Observed 25 40 25 90 
Expected 25 25 40 
Totals 58 59 93 210 
Significant difference in distributions at .001 level 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
Risk Lovers 
Advertising Choices 
$0 $100 $200 Totals 
Low Risk Game Observed 26 40 74 140 
Expected 27 53 60 
High Risk Game Observed 14 40 lp 70 
Expected 13 27 30 
Totals 40 80 90 210 





Low Risk Game 
High Risk Game 
Low Risk Game 
High Risk Game 
TABLE VII 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF 
ADVERTISING FREQUENCIES 




.19 . 29 
High Risk Game 
Advertising 
$0 $100 































DISTRIBUTION OF S FREQUENCIES 
Low Risk Game 
S Values Between: 
< -1 -.5 0 .5 > 
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1 Totals 
Risk Observed 9 15 35 39 8 15 120 
Averters Expected 7 14 36 37 12 13 
Risk Observed 7 16 43 42 18 14 140 
Lovers Expected 9 17 41 44 14 16 
Totals 16 31 77 81 26 29 260 
Significant difference in distributions at .40 level 
High Risk Game 
S Values Between: 
< -1 -.5 0 .5 > 
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1 Totals 
Risk Observed 11 18 18 20 7 16 90 
Ave rte rs Expected 13 15 16 18 10 17 
Risk Observed 13 9 11 12 10 15 70 
Lovers Expected 10 12 13 14 7 14 
Totals 24 27 29 32 17 31 160 
Significant difference in distributions at .40 level 
Risk Averters 
S Values Between: 
< -1 -.5 0 .5 > 
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 Totals 
Low Risk Observed 9 15 34 39 8 15 120 
Game Expected 11 19 39 34 9 18 
High Risk Observed 11 18 18 20 7 16 90 
Game Expected 9 14 22 25 6 13 
Totals 20 33 52 59 15 31 210 
Significant difference in distributions at .20 level 
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TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Risk Lovers 
S Values Between: 
< -1 -.5 0 .5 > 
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1 Totals 
Low Risk Observed 7 16 43 42 18 14 140 
Game Expected 13 17 36 36 19 19 
High Risk Observed 13 9 11 12 10 15 70 
Game Expected 7 8 18 18 9 10 





Low Risk Game 
High Risk Game 
Low Risk Game 
High Risk Game 
TABLE IX 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF 
S FREQUENCIES 
Low Risk Game 
s Values Between: 
< -1 -.5 0 
-1 -.5 0 .5 
.075 .125 .28 .325 
.OS .11 • 31 .30 
High Risk Game 
s Values Between: 
< -1 -.5 0 
-1 -.5 0 .5 
.12 .20 .20 .22 
.19 .13 .16 .17 
Risk Averters 
s Values Between: 
< -1 -.5 0 
-1 -.5 0 .5 
.075 .125 • 28 .325 
.12 .20 .20 • 22 
Risk Lovers 
s Values Between: 
< -1 -.5 0 
-1 -.5 0 .5 
.05 .11 .31 .30 




















DISTRIBUTION OF PROFIT FREQUENCIES 
Low Risk Game 
Profits 
<o 0 to .10 .10 to .20 :::20 Totals 
Risk Observed 5 11 97 7 120 
Averters Expected 4 14 89 14 
Risk Observed 4 19 94 23 140 
Lovers Expected 5 16 103 16 
·Totals 9 .30 191 30 260 
Significant difference in distributions at .05 level 
High Risk Game 
Profits Between: 
< 0 .10 .20 .30 > 
0 .10 .20 .30 .40 .40 Totals 
Risk Observed 8 15 43 11 3 10 90 
Ave rte rs Expected 9 14 42 11 2 12 
Risk Observed 8 10 31 9 1 11 70 
Lovers Expected 7 11 32 9 2 9 
Totals 16 25 74 20 4 21 160 
Significant difference in distributions at • 75 level 
Risk Averters 
Profits 
<0 0 to .10 .10 to .20 >.20 Totals 
Low Risk Observed 5 11 97 7 120 
Game Expected 7 15 80 18 
High Risk Observed 8 15 43 24 90 
Game Expected 6 11 60 13 
Totals 13 26 140 31 210 
Significant difference in distributions at .001 level 
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TABLE X (Continued) 
Risk Lovers 
Profits 
< 0 .10 .20 > 
0 to .10 to .20 to .30 .30 Total 
Low Risk Observed 4 19 94 22 1 140 
Game Expected, 8 19 83 21 9 
High Risk Observed 8 .10 31 9 12 70 
Game Expected 4 10 42 10 4 
Totals 12 29 125 31 13 210 





Low Risk Game 
High Risk Game 
Low Risk Game 
High Risk Game 
TABLE X[ 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF 
PROFIT FREQUENCIES 
Low Risk Game 
Profits 
< 0 0 to • LO .10 to 
.04 .09 .BO 
.03 . lli .67 
High Risk Game. 
Pliofits Between: 
0 .10 • 20 
<O to .10 to .20 to .30 
.09 .17 .48 .12 
.11 .14 .44 .13 
Risk Averters 
Profits 




to .40 >.40 
.03 .11 
.01 .16 
<o 0 to .10 .10 to .20 > .20 
.01 .10 .81 • 06 
.09 .17 .48 .26 
Risk Lovers 
Profits 
<o 0 to .10 .10 to .20 .20 to .30 >.30 
.03 .14 .67 .16 .01 
.11 .14 .44 .17 .17 
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